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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COUNTRY **Poland/China** 25X1A

SUBJECT **Polish-Chinese Exchange of Specialists**

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT #

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1. Between the middle of June and the beginning of August 1954, Warsaw was visited by a Chinese mission for scientific and technical cooperation led by Mr Wang Shou Tao, vice-minister of the Red Chinese government.
2. This mission had arrived in Poland from Czechoslovakia, on a tour of Eastern European countries with which Red China is seeking to secure agreements for an exchange of technical specialists.
3. As result of the Warsaw visit, a protocol on scientific and technical cooperation between the Polish People's Republic and the Chinese People's Republic was signed, introducing mutual exchange of technical specialists for industry. This is a new scheme, which is to operate quite independently from the exchange of students organized by the Center of Democratic Exchange of Students in Moscow (a body established with the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth or AKSM - Antifashistovskiy Komitet Sovetskoy Molodioshi).
4. According to the protocol, during the year 1954, 300 Chinese specialists are to arrive in Poland and 550 Poles are to go to China to various factories.
5. This new scheme introduces a change in the practice of recruiting Polish technical specialists for jobs in China. Until now this action has been carried on under the auspices of the COMECON, and consisted of individual recruitment of technicians. The latest Chinese mission, apparently acting independently from the COMECON, has in fact been sent on COMECON's advice, in order to secure a larger flow of specialists of whom there is an acute shortage in the growing Chinese industry and also, of course, to assure good conditions of training for Chinese technicians.
6. Preparations are already being made in Poland for the reception of the Chinese. Those who will work in Warsaw, are to be accommodated partly in the Soviet camp at Jelonki now occupied by personnel erecting the Palace of Culture (several buildings will soon be vacated in view of the impending departure of some Soviet technicians), and partly in the Students' House on Radomska street. Considering the terrible overcrowding of all Students' Hostels in Warsaw, this prospect is not viewed with much enthusiasm by the Polish university students. The preliminary list of Polish factories with which Chinese specialists are to be associated for practice during this year, is as follows:

Name

Address

Number of Chinese specialists

Army Building Enterprises,  
Warsaw district

12

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Name	Address	Number of Chinese specialists
Lathe Factory: Zakl Przemyslowe Budowy Obrabiarek im 1 Maja	19 Sienkiewicz St, Pruszkow	20
Telecommunication Training Center of Ministry of Public Security	Swider near Warsaw	25
Motorcar Factory Fabryka Samochodow Osobowych (FSO)	Zeran Jadow	32
Telephone Equipment Factory: Zaklady Wytworcze Urzadzen Telefonicznych Im Komuny Paryskiej	341 Grochowska Street, Warsaw	42
Electric Lamp Factory: Zaklady Wytworcze Lamp Elektrycznych im Rozy Luksemburg	32/44 Karolkowa Street, Warsaw	18
Telecommunication Works: Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe Robot Telekomunikacyjnych	15 Zabkowska Street, Warsaw	15
Pharmaceutical Factory: Zaklady Przemyslu Farmaceutycznego	1 Traugutt Street, Grodzisk	5
Artificial Yarn Factory: Państwowa Fabryka Przędzy I Tkanin Sztucznych	Chodakow	25
High-tension Installations: Zaklady Wytworcze Aparatow Wysekiego Napiecia Georgi Dymitrowa	2/6 Kaluszyńska Street, Warsaw	17
Trade Research Institute: Instytut Naukowo-Badawczy Handlu I Zywienia Zbiorowego	51 Kazimierzowska St., Warsaw	5
Optical Works: Polskie Zaklady Optyczne	316/318 Grochowska St Warsaw	11
Railway Works: Państwowe Przedsiębiorstwo Robot Kolejowych	55 Nowogrodzka Street, Warsaw	22
Warsaw Telecommunication Development Centre: Biuro Rozbudowy Warszawskiego Wzela Telekomunikacyjnego	13/17 Czacki Street, Warsaw	10
Precision Apparatus: Fabryka Wyrobow Precyzyjnych im Gen Swierczewskiego	29/31 Kasprzak Street Warsaw	35
Electrotechnical Institute: Główny Instytut Elektrotechniki	68 Piekna Street, Warsaw	6

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COUNTRY  
**Poland**

SUBJECT  
**Fuel Problems in Poland**

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1. The problem of internal fuel supply in Poland is becoming so acute that the regime has been forced to give it much attention recently.
2. Greater emphasis is being placed on the need to economize on coal consumption in industry, transport and power plants. This was discussed at the second conference on coal saving in Warsaw, at the beginning of July 1954.
3. In order to limit consumption of coal, strict regulations are in force according to which, in all peat-producing regions, coal must be supplanted with peat as a heating fuel in private homes, schools, shops, farming co-operatives and in all industrial establishments with the exception of metallurgical ones.
4. All this, however, can only slightly improve the situation which is due to a great shortage of coal. Coal exploitation does not keep pace with the demand. At the above-mentioned conference in Warsaw this was attributed to the alleged increase in the consumption of coal per head, as compared with pre-World War II times. The quoted statistics, however, are misleading. They give the consumption of coal per head in the year 1937 as 736 kilograms (without additional explanation that in that year the population numbered about 33 million, Poland did not possess her newly acquired coal mining regions in Lower Silesia, and the use of coal in industry was incomparably smaller than it is now). The consumption in 1954 comes up to 2,600 kilograms per head (again without additional explanation that all the above three factors have in the meanwhile undergone far-reaching changes, the population alone having fallen to some 25 million. Thus, the comparison of these data has a certain propaganda appeal but no value for factual information. Moreover, the statistics give no comparison in individual consumption of coal for home-heating purposes which is now much smaller than it was before the war, in spite of the acquisition of more coal mines in the recovered territories.
5. The main reason for the shortage of coal is not so much increased home consumption as enormous exports. Exports of Polish coal to the USSR alone are very large, although during the last few years they have been maintained on a more or less equal level. On the other hand, from the end of 1952 transports of coal to East Germany have been on a steady increase.
6. This is connected with the recent restoration to East Germany of the full equipment of huge chemical and machine-making plants of Magdeburg, Merseburg, Schkopau, Thale and Wolfen. These factories had been dismantled by the Red Army after World War II and transported to the USSR. Recently, however, they have been "generously returned" as a gesture of Soviet friendship to the German people. For some time now Polish coal exports to East Germany have been directed to these localities, which fact might indicate that Poland had been given

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the task of supplying the above plants with fuel.

7. Another reason for the shortage of coal is the unsatisfactory functioning of Polish mines, due to a large extent to bad morale of the miners and also to bad working conditions. Still another difficulty arises in some mines which have been fully mechanized or considerably modernized in recent years with Soviet-produced equipment. For instance, the mines Kosciuszko, Wirek and Gigant, for the modernization of which materials and equipment were supplied by the USSR. On the average Soviet-produced installations show signs of unreasonable wear a few months after they start working and become subject to frequent breakdowns. In a fully mechanized mine, one breakdown may sometimes throw the whole works out of gear.
8. This fact has become so obvious that many rumors are circulating in Warsaw to the effect that the USSR supplies Poland with equipment which she does not think good enough for her own use, and orders Poland to pay very high prices for it. However true the rumors, the coal mines which are mechanized and modernized with Western equipment compare with the others most favourably: The wear of machines is normal and breakdowns are much less frequent. Such "lucky" mines are the Czeladz and, in part the Klement Gottwald.
9. The supplementation of peat for coal in home consumption has not been satisfactory, owing to the muddle in distribution. Instead of being used in the regions of its exploitation or in other regions suffering a shortage of fuel, peat was often transported to coal-producing regions where there were no willing consumers. On the other hand, in peat-producing regions, coal brought from afar was used as fuel. Owing to this unreasonable policy, it is estimated that in autumn 1953 some 350 thousand tons of exploited peat were left lying in the fields to be destroyed by rains and heavy weather.
10. Then, too, peat exploitation has not been sufficiently high. Two large and important regions of peat exploitation in Poland are:
  - (a) Lublin county, in the region of Krowie, Bagno [marsh].
  - (b) Bialystok county in the region of Wiana Bagno.

Soon after World War II the regime announced plans for the development of these two regions with the purpose of using them for the creation of great power bases. At enormous expense, counted in millions of zlotys the necessary explorations and tests were made, but the projects had to be discarded since the deposits of peat were found to be too small to justify the construction of power plants. (The tests were completed in the summer of 1953).
11. In the meanwhile peat exploitation was developing very slowly. In 1951, peat production in Poland amounted barely to 600 thousand tons, and in 1952 a little over 800 thousand. The obsolete exploitation methods used by agricultural state-owned estates and cooperative farms, and also by the Samopomoc Chlopska state-owned cooperative had discouraging results. Moreover, large quantities of Polish peat were being exported to Czechoslovakia.
12. If the regime wishes to partly supplement the shortage of coal with home-produced peat, a wide reform of the organization of exploitation and distribution of peat will be necessary.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INFORMATION REPORT

25X1A

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SUBJECT "Honduras News Notes" /ELECTIONPLACE ACQUIRED  
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1. "The parliamentary run-offs on 24 and 31 Oct 54 failed to bring about a decisive solution to the electoral problem in Honduras, and as a consequence the status of the new Honduran president is still in the air. There now is the possibility that President Gálvez will continue in power at the head of an ex facto government at the termination of his present period of office on 31 Dec 54. The 24 Oct 54 elections gave the following parliamentary results: Liberal Party, 18 deputies; Nationalist Party, 22 deputies; Reform Party, 11 deputies. The Liberals are quite bitter, since they dropped three deputies from the previous indicated lineup shown by the results of the 10 October election.
2. "In the parliamentary run-off held on 31 Oct 54 in Cortés department, Cortés remained in the Liberal Party column as in the two previous elections, and the outcome was unchanged although the Liberals now have a total of 23 deputies.
3. "Information published in Guatemala City claimed that armed supporters of Gen Tiburcio Carías Andino had prevented voters of opposition parties from going to the polls, particularly in El Paraíso and Cortés departments. It was in El Paraíso department where the Liberals lost a nominal three seats to the slate of candidates offered by Carías' Nationalist Party. If the Reformists' group goes along with the Nationalists, the lineup in Congress will be 33 for the Nationalist-Reform side and 23 at the most for the Liberals. These 33 votes are sufficient to elect a new president from the two leading candidates, General Carías and Dr Ramón Villeda Morales of the Liberal Party. However, 33 is not a sufficient number for a quorum. The Liberals are hopeful they may win some Reform support in the meantime. Under any circumstances the Liberals can absent themselves

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from Congress and thereby prevent Congress from electing a new president to succeed Galvez. The issue then would pass to the Supreme Court, which is pro-Carías, but if there is no decision here, Gálvez would continue in office until such time he thought propitious to call another presidential election. The Liberals are still addressing Dr Villeda Morales and his vice presidential candidate, Enrique Ortez Pinel as President and Vice President-elect. There has been no indication whether the Liberals will peacefully abide by the parliamentary switches. So far there is nothing to make one believe that there will be any major internal trouble.

4. "Rumors persist that the Reformists are willing to go along with the Nationalists and elect General Carías to the presidency on the understanding that he will resign shortly after taking office, transferring the power to vice president Gregorio Reyes Zelaya. This speculation is based, of course, upon the assumption that a quorum in Congress can be obtained. There was much political maneuvering just before the 24 Oct 54 run-off election. Each political faction was actively attempting to discredit the opposition to strengthen their own position. For example, the pro-Williams newspapers El Día and Prensa Libre reported a possible strike among the banana regions of the North Coast. The pro-Villeda Morales El Pueblo responded by saying their assertions were false. Dr Villeda Morales in a radio speech two days before asked that the Liberals be careful not to participate in any such movement.
5. "The Liberal newspaper El Pueblo, 20 Oct 54, just before the 24 October elections, commented: 'The solution of the Honduran political problem not only is national in character, but above all international. If the popular will is flouted, Communism will be a reality in Honduras in a short time. As a result Honduras and America has before it this dilemma: Liberalism or Communism. Our colleague, El Día, recently has been discussing the serious danger in respect to Communist infiltration in our country, certain that such news only confirms the thesis supported by El Cronista and El Pueblo in a sense that if by foul maneuvers Congress flouts the popular will clearly expressed at the polls in favor of Liberalism, Honduras would be converted into the headquarters of Communism in Central America....The welfare of Honduras, happy or disgraceful, depends upon the patriotism and the honest citizenship of the future deputies to the National Congress. Only then will fall the thundering anathema of history if to please sectarian convenience they thrust this country into the abyss of Left-wing democracy or throw it over the precipice to the violences of the Right.'
6. "The Liberal vice presidential candidate, Enrique Ortez Pinel, in a radiocast 28 Oct 54, threatened that at all costs the Liberals would take over on 1 Jan 55, claiming this would have the blessing of other nations as it was well known by all they had won the elections.
7. "The government was perturbed over various comments appearing in the foreign press, especially in the US, concerning the situation in Honduras and ordered the communications companies not to transmit certain dispatches filed by the AP and UP correspondents. According to El Día, 29 Oct 54, this action precipitated threat of a strike by Honduran newspaper and radio-news men. The Honduran Press Association decided to present a protest against censorship to the government."

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